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Abstract
This paper investigates the problem of bidirectional energy ex-
change between electric vehicles (EVs) and road lanes embedded with
wireless power transfer technologies called wireless charging-discharging
lanes (WCDLs). As such, EVs could provide better services to the
grid, especially for balancing the supply-demand, while bringing con-
venience for EV users, because no cables and EV stops are needed. To
enable this EV–WCDL energy exchange, a novel decentralized peer-
to-peer (P2P) trading mechanism is proposed, in which EVs directly
negotiate with a WCDL to reach consensus on the energy price and
amounts to be traded. Those energy price and amounts are solu-
tions of an optimization problem aiming at optimizing private cost
functions of EVs and WCDL. The negotiation process between EVs
and WCDL is secured by a privacy-preserving consensus mechanism.
Further, to assure successful trading with desired energy price and
amounts, an analytical and systematic method is proposed to select
cost function parameters by EVs and WCDL in a fully decentralized
manner. Simulations are then carried out to validate developed the-
oretical results, which confirm the effectiveness and scalability of the
proposed algorithm.
Key words. Electric Vehicle; Wireless Power Transfer; Wireless Charg-
ing Discharging Lane; Peer-to-Peer Energy Trading; Privacy-Preserving Con-
sensus.
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Nomenclature
P2P Peer-to-peer.
EV Electric vehicle.
WPT Wireless power transfer.
IWPT Inductive wireless power transfer.
WCDL Wireless charging-discharging lane.
DR Demand response.
MAS Multi-agent system.
EV,i, EL,i, EL Trading energy of EV i, of WCDL with EV i, and total
trading energy of WCDL [kWh].
fV,i, fL Private cost functions of EV i and WCDL.
aV,i, bV,i Parameters in the cost function of EV i.
aL, bL Parameters in the cost function of WCDL.
EV,i, EV,i Lower and upper bounds for trading energy of EV i.
EL, EL Lower and upper bounds for trading energy of WCDL.
1 Introduction
Recent disasters worldwide as aftermaths of global climate changes, which
greatly affect to human living and global economics, urge serious actions
worldwide, in which reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is a must.
To achieve that, transportation and energy systems should be on priority
since their portions in the total GHG emissions are highest among industrial
sectors.
Currently, transportation systems are increasingly being electrified, while
energy systems including electric power grids are witnessing a rapid transfor-
mation from fossil fuel based and centralized generation to renewable based
and increasingly distributed generation. Nevertheless, massive deployment
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of EVs faces great challenges due to: (i) high cost; (ii) limited range due
to limited capacity of energy conversion and storage devices, e.g., battery
or fuel cell; and (iii) limited number of charging points. Similarly, current
energy infrastructure and markets are not ready for a prompt transition to
renewable generation and decentralized operations.
WPT has recently emerged as an promising approach to overcome the
aforementioned drawback of EVs deployment [29, 5, 1, 10, 14, 25]. Especially,
the concept of dynamic wireless charging, enabled through wireless charging
lanes, help extend traveling ranges of EVs, while giving convenience to EV
owners, since no stop and cables are required for charging EVs. Therefore,
dynamic wireless charging creates a mutual relation between transportation
and energy systems, in which EV serves as a bridge. To further facilitates that
mutual relation, this research investigates the bidirectional WPT between
EVs and the so-called WCDLs, i.e., EVs are able to not only get charging
from WCDLs, but also discharge to WCDLs.
The EV–WCDL bidirectional energy exchange is attractive due to its
capability of on-the-fly charging and discharging – a great option that brings
the ultra-mobility, convenience and comfort for users, where no stop and
plug-in cables are required. Furthermore, EV fleets can serve as a super-
flexible and clean resource for providing a wider range of ancillary services to
the grid. In areas with deep penetration of renewables, e.g., California, USA,
or Kyushu, Japan, curtailments on renewable power generation were made
to guarantee the supply-demand balance, even with some types of energy
storage systems [2]. In such situations, charging or discharging from a large
number of EVs could help reduce the curtailed amount and diminish the so-
called duck curve [2], where ancillary services can be provided by EV fleets
not only at noon when they are parked at homes or offices but also in the
morning and in the afternoon when they are moving on roads. As a result,
both transportation and energy systems can become low-carbon emission
systems.
From the energy system perspective, a WCDL supplemented with renew-
able sources (e.g., solar, wind, etc.) along road sides can be regarded as a pro-
sumer who can both produce and consume energy. Likewise, an EV with on-
site storage systems (e.g., battery, supercapacitor, etc.) can also be regarded
as a prosumer. Thus, energy exchange between an EV group and a WCDL is
in fact energy trading between prosumers, of which innovative market mod-
els have recently been studied, for instance the so-called peer-to-peer (P2P)
energy market. A number of works in the recent literature has been devoted
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to investigate P2P energy systems, see e.g., [31, 4, 32, 18, 33, 26, 17, 34, 15].
However, in all of those works, the problems of how to select parameters
of prosumers’ cost functions and how to tune them if the derived energy
transactions are unsuccessful or unsatisfied have not been investigated.
To the author’s best knowledge, this research is the first to study the
P2P bidirectional energy trading between EVs and WCDLs. Moreover, this
research contributes the following to the literature.
• P2P bidirectional energy trading between EVs and WCDLs as an in-
centive mechanism for EVs to provide ancillary service for the grid,
e.g., DR responses.
• Analytical solution for the optimal P2P energy market clearing prob-
lem, by which the negotiation between EVs and a WCDL is conducted
through consensus algorithms enhanced with a privacy-preserving mech-
anism to avoid exposing private parameters of EVs and the WCDL.
• A fully decentralized method to select parameters in the cost functions
of EVs and the WCDL to achieve successful P2P energy transactions
with expected energy price and energy amounts.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, system de-
scription is given, and problems are formulated. Consequently, a decentral-
ized P2P energy trading mechanism for EVs and the tuning of cost function
parameters for the WCDL and EVs are proposed in Section 3. The illustrat-
ing simulations are presented in Section 5. Lastly, the paper is summarized
in Section 6.
2 System Description
2.1 Wireless Charging-Discharging Lane
In this research, it is assumed that the resonant IWPT technology is used for
the WCDL, where coils are placed under the WCDL, and the other coils are
attached under the chassis or in the wheels of EVs (see, e.g. [14], for WPT
between wireless charging lanes and EVs with in-wheel motors and coils).
Denote the number of underground wireless power transceivers by nc and
the length of each charging-discharging segment (assumed the same length
4
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Figure 1: Illustration for EVs moving on wireless charging-discharging lanes
(upper), and under-road wireless charging-discharging segments (lower).
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for all segments) in the WCDL by ℓc. When the ith EV is charged from the
WCDL, the energy it receives is calculated by
Ec,i = Prηd,rηc,ini
ℓc
vwpt
, (1)
where Ec,i is the received energy by EV i; Pr is the rated power of each trans-
mitting segment; ηd,r is the wireless discharging efficiency of the segments;
ηc,i is the charging efficiency of EV i; ni(≤ nc) is the number of charging seg-
ments that the ith EV passes through; and vwpt is the designated velocity on
the WCDL. A similar formula can be derived when the ith EV is discharged
to the WCDL as follows,
Ed,i = PEV,iηd,iηc,rni
ℓc
vwpt
, (2)
where Ed,i, PEV,i, ηd,i are the discharged energy, discharged power, and wire-
less discharging efficiency, of EV i, respectively; ηc,r is the wireless charging
efficiency of the segments.
2.2 Issues on Wireless Energy Exchange for EVs
In order for enabling P2P energy exchange between EVs and WCDLs, the
P2P market clearing mechanism, which is the main issue, needs to be derived.
This P2P energy trading can also be regarded as a mechanism to incentivize
EV owners for actively participating in DR programs. Hence, a novel ap-
proach will be proposed in Section 3 to address it. The negotiation between
EVs and a WCDL is supported by a proper information and communication
infrastructure, assumed readily available.
An additional issue arises on the coordination of multiple EVs, e.g. when
they switch between normal lanes and WCDLs. This problem can be suitably
dealt with by platoon formation control methods which have been extensively
investigated in the literature as a solution to improve the smoothness of
traffic flows and energy saving for the whole vehicle group. A well-established
framework to study formation control problems is MAS (see, e.g. [24, 27, 23,
30, 13]), where each vehicle is cast as an agent. It should be noted that
for vehicle formation control, the inter-vehicle information such as relative
position and relative speed are most essential. Therefore, the edge (i.e., the
vehicle-to-vehicle or agent-to-agent) dynamical evolution is very important.
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Recently, several works [11, 12, 9, 35, 20, 22, 19, 6] have studied MASs using
edge dynamics, by which the formation control problems are converted to
equivalent stabilization problems at the origin which is much easier to deal
with than the consensus problems on manifolds. However, none of the works
in [11, 12, 9, 35, 20, 22, 19] considered the formation control problems of
vehicles under the changes on speeds of vehicles and on road lanes. In our
recent studies [8, 7], both uncertainty and disturbance in formation control of
autonomous EVs have been dealt with. To make the current paper focused,
details on formation control of EVs will not be presented.
3 EV-WCDLDecentralized Privacy-Preserving
Optimal Trading
In this section, a bidirectional trading mechanism between EV and WCDL
prosumers is proposed. As mentioned in Section 2.2, the P2P energy trading
between EVs and WCDL owners can be considered as an incentive mech-
anism for EV owners to join in DR programs. This is especially useful to
flatten steep ramps (up and down) on the net load curve, which could oc-
cur around noon and in the evening when renewable outputs are very high
and very low, respectively. Therefore, WCDL owners do not set fixed en-
ergy price, but instead let EV owners negotiate the energy trading price and
amount to encourage them charge or discharge in advance of their plans. It
is worth emphasizing that the charging/discharging of EVs through WCDLs
considered in this paper does not mean to completely replace the conventional
charging/discharging of parked EVs (at homes, offices, etc.), but instead an
alternative solution to it.
There would be multiple WCDLs and many EVs that could exchange
energy with the others, however, different from stationay prosumers such as
households with rooftop solar panels, EVs are mobile prosumers. Therefore,
EVs owners would choose the closest WCDLs (to their routes) for energy
trading, i.e., each EV sells or buys energy to only one WCDL. Hence, in the
following, we formulate and solve the P2P energy trading between n EVs
and one WCDL.
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3.1 Characterization of Optimal Solution
Each EV prosumer (EV owner) has an objective function, assumed to be
quadratic and convex, as follows,
fV,i(EV,i) = aV,iE
2
V,i + bV,iEV,i (3)
where aV,i > 0 and bV,i > 0 are constant coefficients known only by EV
prosumer i, EV,i is the traded energy of EV i. Likewise, a WCDL prosumer
(WCDL owner) has a cost function, also assumed to be quadratic and convex,
fL(EL) = aLE
2
L + bLEL (4)
where aL > 0 and bL > 0 are constant coefficients known only by the WCDL
prosumer, EL is the traded energy of the WCDL. Thus, the optimization to
be solved for the P2P energy trading between EVs and a WCDL is
min
n∑
i=1
fV,i(EV,i) + fL(EL) (5a)
s.t. EV,i + EL,i = 0, (5b)
EL ≤ EL =
n∑
i=1
EL,i ≤ EL, (5c)
EV,i ≤ EV,i ≤ EV,i. (5d)
When EVs are charged by the WCDL, EV,i > 0, EL,i < 0, hence EV,i = 0,
E¯L = 0. Likewise, as EVs are discharged to the WCDL, EV,i < 0, EL,i > 0,
and E¯V,i = 0, EL = 0. For conciseness, in the following only the scenario of
EV charging is presented, and the case of EV discharging can be obtained in
a similar manner.
The optimization problem for EV-WCDL cooperation when EVs are
charged is as follows.
min
n∑
i=1
fV,i(EV,i) + fL(EL) (6a)
s.t. EV,i + EL,i = 0, (6b)
EL ≤ EL =
n∑
i=1
EL,i ≤ 0, (6c)
0 ≤ EV,i ≤ E¯V,i. (6d)
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The Lagrangian associated with (6) is
L =
n∑
i=1
fV,i(EV,i) + fL(EL)−
n∑
i=1
λi(EV,i + EL,i)
− µL,1(EL − EL) + µL,2EL
−
n∑
i=1
µˆV,iEV,i +
n∑
i=1
µˇV,i(EV,i − E¯V,i),
where λi, µL,1 ≥ 0, µL,2 ≥ 0, µˆV,i ≥ 0, µˇV,i ≥ 0 are Lagrange multipliers
associated with the constraints (6b)–(6d). Next, the following assumptions,
which are reasonable in practical situations, are employed.
A1: Successful trading for the WCDL and all EVs.
A2: Lower bound EL of WCDL selling energy and upper bound E¯V,i of EV
buying energy are sufficiently small and large, respectively.
Remark 1 The above assumptions are employed to simplify the character-
ization of optimal solutions of (6). Later, in Section 4, a method will be
introduced to guarantee successful trading between EVs and the WCDL, and
to satisfy the constraints (6c)–(6d), i.e., to satisfy both assumption A1 and
assumption A2.
Because the cost functions of EVs and the WCDL are assumed as in (3)
and (4) and all constraints are linear, the mathematical programming (6)
is convex. Therefore, KKT conditions are necessary and sufficient for (6),
which read as follows.
∂fV,i(EV,i)
∂EV,i
∣∣∣∣
E∗
V,i
− λi − µˆV,i + µˇV,i = 0, (7a)
∂fL(EL)
∂EL,i
∣∣∣∣
E∗
L,i
− λi − µL,1 + µL,2 = 0, (7b)
E∗V,i + E
∗
L,i = 0, (7c)
µL,1
(
n∑
i=1
E∗L,i −EL
)
= 0, µL,2E
∗
L,i = 0,
µˆV,iE
∗
V,i = 0, µˇV,i(E
∗
V,i − E¯V,i) = 0, (7d)
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where E∗V,i and E
∗
L,i are optimal values of EV,i and EL,i, respectively. Then,
assumption A1 leads to µˆV,i = 0 and µL,2 = 0, while assumption A2 implies
that µˇV,i = 0 and µL,1 = 0. Thus, (7) becomes
2aV,iE
∗
V,i + bV,i − λi = 0, (8a)
2aL
n∑
i=1
E∗L,i + bL − λi = 0, (8b)
E∗V,i + E
∗
L,i = 0. (8c)
Equation (8b) reveals that all the energy prices λi for individual P2P trading
between the WCDL and one EV are the same. Denote this unique price by λ.
Next, dividing both sides of (8a) by aV,i, both sides of (8b) by aL, summing
them up and utilizing (8c), we obtain
0 =
n∑
i=1
bV,i
aV,i
+
bL
aL
− λ
(
n∑
i=1
1
aV,i
+
1
aL
)
,
⇔ λ =
(
n∑
i=1
bV,i
aV,i
+
bL
aL
)/(
n∑
i=1
1
aV,i
+
1
aL
)
. (9)
Accordingly, the optimal energy to be traded by the WCDL and each EV
are as follows,
n∑
i=1
E∗L,i = E
∗
L =
1
2aL
(λ− bL) ,
E∗V,i =
1
2aV,i
(λ− bV,i) .
(10)
3.2 Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Negotiation of
P2P Market Clearing Price
It is obvious from (9) that the P2P market clearing price between the WCDL
and EVs is calculated using information from all of them. Nevertheless,
each EV is only communicated with the WCDL for energy trading, hence
a mechanism to attain (9) in a decentralized manner is needed. This is
achievable by using consensus algorithms for MASs, such as the following.
10
Let the WCDL and EVs run a consensus algorithm with variables x0 (for
the WCDL) and xi (for EV i), whose initial values are set to be:
x0(0) =
[
bL
aL
,
1
aL
]T
,
xi(0) =
[
bV,i
aV,i
,
1
aV,i
]T
, i = 1, . . . , n.
(11)
At time step k ≥ 0, the WCDL and each EV communicate to run the fol-
lowing consensus algorithm,
xi(k + 1) = aiixi(k) +
∑
j∈Ni
aijxj(k), i = 0, 1, . . . , n, (12)
where 0 < aij < 1 ∀ j ∈ Ni, 0 < aii < 1 are constant parameters satisfying
n∑
j=0
aij = 1 ∀ i = 0, . . . , n. There are multiple ways to choose aij, e.g. the
Metropolis weights [21]. Then it can be proved, follows the standard proof
for average consensus in the literature (see, e.g. [24], [27]), that all variables
xi reach the average consensus vector xave = [xave,1, xave,2]
T , as k →∞, where
xave,1 ,
n∑
i=1
bV,i
aV,i
+
bL
aL
n + 1
, xave,2 ,
n∑
i=1
1
aV,i
+
1
aL
n + 1
. (13)
As such, the P2P market clearing price λ is computed by the WCDL and
each EV as follows,
λ =
xave,1
xave,2
. (14)
As seen from (12), the initial values of the WCDL and EVs are exchanged,
therefore their private parameters aL, bL and aV,i, bV,i are exposed, which is
a critical privacy issue that they do not want. To clear this concern, several
approaches can be employed to secure the WCDL-EV information exchange,
which can be categorized into encrypted and non-encrypted approaches. For
the former, Paillier additive homomorphic cryptosystem is currently one of
the most used algorithm for public key cryptography (see, e.g. [28]). For
the latter, a few studies have been conducted to obtain secured consensus
algorithms that converge exactly to the average of initial values (see, e.g.
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[16]). While the former can provide better privacy guarantee, its computa-
tional complexity is higher, hence longer computational time. Thus, there
is always a tradeoff between privacy and computation overhead for secure
consensus algorithms.
It is worth emphasizing that decentralized cryptosystem is still a hard
problem. For example, the work in [28] required an assumption that each
agent has at least a trustable neighboring agent who does not try to infer the
other agent’s initial condition. On the other hand, the masking approach in
[16] necessitated the non-overlapping neighboring sets between agents, there-
fore in star networks, such as that in the current research, can only guarantee
the privacy of the center node (the WCDL in the current research), but can-
not protect the privacy of the other nodes (EVs in the current research).
To this end, derivation of a decentralized privacy-preserving algorithm for
consensus problem, which is applicable to any network topology and uses
non-conservative assumptions, needs much more works, hence should be con-
sidered in a separated study.
For the current research, if we assume that the WCDL owner has a limited
computability that prevents it from trying to infer private parameters of
many EVs communicated to it for P2P energy trading, i.e., initial values of
EVs in (11), then the masking approach in [16] can be utilized. Each peer
(whether the WCDL or an EV) creates a masked state
x˜i(k) = xi(k) + [wi,1(k), wi,2(k)]
T , (15)
in which wi,1(k) and wi,2(k) are random noises generated by:
wi,ℓ(k) =
{
ζi,ℓ(0), if k = 0,
αki ζi,ℓ(k)− α
k−1
i ζi,ℓ(k − 1), otherwise,
(16)
for ℓ = 1, 2, where ζi,ℓ(k) are Gaussian random variables independently gen-
erated by each peer j from a standard normal distribution, i.e., a normal
distribution with mean 0 and variance 1; and 0 < αj < 1 is a constant. Then
the secure consensus algorithm is given by,
xi(k + 1) = aiix˜i(k) +
∑
j∈Ni
aij x˜i(k), i = 0, 1, . . . , n. (17)
It was proved in [16] the privacy-preserving consensus algorithm (17) con-
verges exactly to the average vector xave shown in (13).
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Note that αi are distinct for i = 0, 1, . . . , n, hence the noise wi(k) gen-
eration is completely independent (fully decentralized) for the considering
peers.
4 Selection of Cost Function Parameters for
Desired EV-WCDL P2P Energy Trading
As seen in Section 3, the P2P energy trading between the WCDL and EVs
strongly depends on their cost functions, more specifically their cost function
parameters aL, bL, and aV,i, bV,i. Nevertheless, how to set the values of those
parameters for deriving expected energy transaction price and amount is
ad hoc for the WCDL and each EV owner, and has not been addressed
in the literature. Therefore, in this section a cooperative learning strategy
is proposed to tune cost function parameters of the WCDL and EVs for
attaining desired energy transactions, based on the analytical solution (9)–
(10) of the P2P optimal clearing problem (6).
4.1 Fully Decentralized Setting of Cost Function Pa-
rameters
Since E∗L < 0 and E
∗
V,i > 0 ∀ i = 1, . . . , n, it is obtained from (10) that
bmaxV,i < λ < bL, (18)
where bmaxV,i , max
i=1,...,n
bV,i. Therefore, the WCDL and EVs need to set their pa-
rameters bL and bV,i properly to obtain a desired energy trading price. Here,
it is proposed that each EV and the WCDL select its range of expected trad-
ing price, denoted by [λi, λi], i = 0, 1, . . . , n, where the subscript 0 represents
the WCDL. Consequently, these price ranges will be exchanged between EVs
and the WCDL to obtain a common range of price for all. This coopera-
tive negotiation procedure follows standard consensus algorithms similarly
to that in (12), where lower and upper bounds of EV and the WCDL prices
are updated by such consensus algorithms, as follows.
λi(k + 1) = aiiλi(k) +
∑
j∈Ni
aijλi(k),
λi(k + 1) = aiiλi(k) +
∑
j∈Ni
aijλi(k),
(19)
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for i = 0, 1, . . . , n, where aij , i, j = 0, . . . , n are the same as for (12). Note
that no secure algorithm is needed here because EVs and the WCDL need
to know exactly the price range of the other.
After reaching consensus on the price range, denoted by [λ, λ], EVs and
WCDL need to set their parameters to assure successful P2P energy transac-
tions, i.e., to satsify (18). To do so, EVs and WCDL choose their parameters
by the following rule,
bV,i ∈
[
λ,
1
2
(λ+ λ)
)
, bL ∈
(
1
2
(λ+ λ), λ
]
(20)
which ensure max
i=1,...,n
bV,i < bL and λ ∈ [λ, λ]. Then it can be easily shown
that λ < bL by utilizing (9). Next, to guarantee that b
max
V,i < λ, we substitute
λ− bmaxV,i into (9) to obtain the following condition,
0 <
n∑
i=1
bV,i − bmaxV,i
aV,i
+
bL − bmaxV,i
aL
,
which is true if
0 <
n∑
i=1
bminV,i − b
max
V,i
aV,i
+
bL − bmaxV,i
aL
⇔ (bmaxV,i − b
min
V,i )
n∑
i=1
1
aV,i
<
bL − bmaxV,i
aL
, (21)
where bminV,i , min
i=1,...,n
bV,i. Due to (20), we further obtain the following condi-
tion as a sufficiency for (21), hence for (18),
λ− λ
2
n∑
i=1
1
aV,i
<
1
aL
(
bL −
λ+ λ
2
)
. (22)
Next, let [EL, 0) and (0, EV,i] be the ranges of desired energy amounts to be
traded for the WCDL and EV i, as in (6c) and (6d). Utilizing (10) and (18),
we obtain
E∗V,i <
1
2aV,i
(bL − bV,i) ≤
1
2aV,i
(
bL − b
min
V,i
)
. (23)
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Note that bL ≤ λ and bminV,i ≥ λ, therefore a sufficient condition for attaining
E∗V,i < EV,i is that
1
2aV,i
(
λ− λ
)
≤ EV,i ⇔
1
2aV,i
≤
EV,i
λ− λ
. (24)
This gives EVs a way to choose their parameters aV,i in a completely decen-
tralized manner.
Now, substituting (24) into (22) results in the following condition for aL
such that (22) is satisfied,
n∑
i=1
EV,i <
1
aL
(
bL −
λ+ λ
2
)
⇔ aL <
bL −
λ+λ
2
n∑
i=1
EV,i
. (25)
On the other hand, the following should be satisfied for the WCDL,
EL < E
∗
L =
λ− bL
2aL
=
1
2aL
∑n
i=1
bV,i−bL
aV,i∑n
i=1
1
aV,i
+ 1
aL
. (26)
We have bV,i − bL ≥ bminV,i − bL ≥ λ − λ, hence the following condition is
sufficient for (26),
(λ− λ)
1
2aL
∑n
i=1
1
aV,i
1∑n
i=1 aV,i
+ 1
aL
> EL
⇔ 2aL +
2∑n
i=1
1
aV,i
>
λ− λ
EL
. (27)
Using (24), the following is sufficient for (27),
2aL +
λ− λ∑n
i=1EV,i
>
λ− λ
EL
⇔ aL >
λ− λ
2
(
−1
EL
−
1∑n
i=1EV,i
)
. (28)
Note that the range for aL specified in (25) and (28) requires the upper
bounds EV,i of traded energy from EVs, which are sent to the WCDL as a
part of negotiation procedure.
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Algorithm 1: Decentralized P2P Energy Trading for Charging EVs
from the WCDL
1 WCDL and EVs choose their initial price ranges;
2 EVs select maximum energy amounts EV,i to be charged through the
WCDL, and send them to the WCDL;
3 WCDL chooses its upper bound EL of energy amount to trade with
EVs;
4 % Negotiation of energy trading price range
5 for 1 ≤ k ≤ max iter do
6 WCDL and EVs run the consensus algorithm (19);
7 if k = max iter, or |λi(k + 1)− λi(k)| ≤ ǫ,
|λi(k + 1)− λi(k)| ≤ ǫ ∀ i = 0, . . . , n, then
8 break;
9 end
10 end
11 WCDL and EVs obtain the common P2P energy trading price range
[λ, λ];
12 % Selection of cost function parameters
13 WCDL and EVs select bL and bV,i to satisfy (20);
14 EVs choose aV,i to satisfy (24);
15 WCDL selects aL to satisfy (25) and (28);
16 % Privacy-preserving negotiation of P2P energy trading price
17 for 1 ≤ k ≤ max iter do
18 WCDL and EVs run the masked consensus algorithm (17);
19 if k = max iter, or ‖x˜i(k + 1)− x˜i(k)‖2 ≤ ǫ ∀ i = 0, . . . , n, then
20 break;
21 end
22 end
23 WCDL and EVs compute the P2P energy trading price λ by (14);
24 WCDL and EVs compute the P2P energy trading amount by (10);
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4.2 Summary of The Proposed P2P Energy Trading
Mechanism
Denote max iter the maximum number of iterations for the consensus algo-
rithms (12), (17), and (19). Let ǫ be a given small positive number. The
proposed decentralized P2P energy trading mechanism between the WCDL
and EVs is summarized in Algorithm 1.
5 Numerical Simulation
This section aims at demonstrating the proposed P2P energy trading algo-
rithm between the WCDL and EVs. Assume that the rated power by the
WCDL is 400kW, the resonant IWPT efficiency is ηd,r = 90%, the conversion
efficiency of the electronic circuit on EVs is ηc,i = 95%, the total length of
wireless charging segments is 3 km, and the speed of EVs on the WCL is
vwpt = 50 km/h (which is the limit on most urban roads in Japan), then the
maximum energy that one EV can get from the WCDL, computed in (1), is
20.52kWh. Here, the number of EVs is first assumed to be 50.
As shown in Algorithm 1, the WCDL and EVs first set their initial price
range for the negotiation. It is noted that the feed-in tariff (FIT) in Japan
for the fiscal year 2020 is 21 JPY/kWh for under 10kW solar generation [3].
Therefore, it is assumed here that the WCDL initially set its price range to be
[24, 28] JPY/kWh to incentivize EVs, whereas EVs expect a higher price with
their initial lower and upper bounds of price ranges randomly selected around
27 JPY/kWh and 31 JPY/kWh. Then, utilizing the consensus algorithm
(19), the negotiation between WCDL and EVs is depicted in Figure 2. It is
obtained that λ = 27.2 JPY/kWh, and λ = 31.04 JPY/kWh.
Next, EVs set their maximum amounts of traded energy EV,i = 15kWh,
and send to the WCDL. Then the WCDL set EL = −700kWh. Consequently,
following (20), WCDL choose its bL to be 30, while EVs randomly select
their bV,i between 27.2 and 29.12. In the next step, EVs randomly choose
their parameters aV,i such that they satisfy (24), which in this case reads
aV,i ≥ 0.128. For the WCDL, condition (28) is always satisfied here, because
the right hand side is negative. On the other hand, condition (25) says
aL < 0.0012, hence it is chosen to be 0.0009. Afterward, WCDL and EVs
run the masked consensus algorithm (17) to derive the P2P market clearing
price λ, whose results are shown in Figure 3–5. It can be observed that
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Figure 2: Negotiation of P2P energy price between the WCDL and EVs.
even in the presence of added noises, state variables of WCDL and EVs
still converge to their averages, and hence, their ratio, i.e., the P2P market
clearing price converge exactly to the optimal solution (9), as depicted in
Figure 4. Moreover, all EVs are successfully traded with the WCDL, as
exhibited in Figure 5.
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Figure 3: Privacy-preserving consensus of peers.
Finally, the scalability of the proposed P2P energy trading algorithm
is tested, where the number of EVs is increased from 50 to 100, 150, and
200. It is noted that all the results presented in Section 3 and Section 4 are
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analytical, hence the running time of the proposed decentralized P2P energy
trading algorithm for EVs and WCDL depends on that of the consensus
protocols and communication time between EVs and WCDL. Here, the latter
is ignored, and only the former is checked, whose results are plotted in Figure
6. It can be observed that the running time is increased almost linearly with
system size, thus the proposed algorithm is scalable well.
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Figure 6: Running time of the proposed EV–WCDL P2P energy trading
algorithm (without communication time between EVs and WCDL).
6 CONCLUSION
A decentralized P2P energy trading algorithm has been proposed in this
paper for energy exchange between EVs and aWCDL. Analytical formulas for
the P2P market clearing price and optimal energy trading amounts have been
obtained, based on which a method has been introduced to properly select
the cost function parameters of both the EVs and the WCDL such that all
peers successfully trade with desired energy price and energy amounts. It is
remarkable that this method is also analytical, hence no iterative procedure is
needed to tune such parameters. Further, a privacy-preserving approach has
been employed to protect peers from private information leak. The proposed
algorithm performance and scalability are well verified through a test case.
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